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COMMENTS
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY*
In the annals of the Supreme Court, 1961 marks a milestone. Once
again, the highest court of the land was called upon to delve into the
essence of the first amendment. The suit before the court was that of the
Communist Party of the United States v. The Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board.' The question raised was whether the Communist Party could,
consistent with the first amendment, be compelled to register as required
by the Subversive Activities Control Act.2 In an exhaustive opinion, Jus-
tice Frankfurter, speaking for the court, stated that, though "compulsory
disclosure of the names of an organization's members may in certain
instances infringe constitutionally protected rights of association, ' 3
"[a]gainst the impediments which particular governmental regulation
causes to entire freedom of individual action, there must be weighed the
value to the public of the ends which the regulation may achieve. ' 4 With
a majority of one the court boldly announced its position on the first
amendment freedom of association.5
Fifty years ago only the familiar four freedoms were recognized. To-
day, a fifth is being litigated into prominence, the right of association.
Fifty years ago, the validity of such a right might have been questioned.
Today, it is recognized as an integral part of the freedoms guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. To refer to it as a new freedom would be amiss for
it is only a further development of the freedom of assembly so plainly
stated in the first amendment. It is a progression in the evolutionary
*This paper has been submitted to the Illinois Constitutional Study Commission,
created by the Illinois Legislature in 1965.
1367 U.S. 1 (1961).
2 Subversive Activities Control Act § 7, Internal Security Act, 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C.
§ 781 (1950).
3 Supra note 1 at 90. 4 Id. at 91.
5Also included in the two hundred and two pages of opinion were the dissenting
opinions of Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black, Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan.
In Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 968 (1964), the court of appeals set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial.
The case was not reversed on the constitutional principles enunciated; however, to
sustain a criminal charge for failure to comply with registration requirements, it must
appear that someone was available who was either legally bound or willing to sign. As
this qualification was not met, the conviction was set aside. In connection with this,
see infra note 89.
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process of the right of assembly. As in every evolutionary process, ex-
ternal factors adjust the internal structure in order to adapt it to new
conditions. So the right of assembly has been adjusted to adapt it to the
complex problems of the times.
Freedom of assembly became a fundamental right in the United States
when it was incorporated into the first amendment. At the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 there were many delegates who felt that the Consti-
tution itself should guaranty the right of assembly. 6 The majority, how-
ever, considered such an inclusion inappropriate since such a right was
inalienable and its pronouncement therefore redundant. 7 In order to
satisfy all factions, it was agreed that the Constitution would not contain
a guaranty of essential freedoms, but shortly thereafter such rights as
free speech, press, etc., would be guaranteed by amendment.
In formulating the first amendment, it was a forgone conclusion that
the right of assembly would be included. Historically it was announced
as early as the Magna Carta,8 being a natural by-product of the right of
petition. Freedom of assembly thus became one of the natural rights of
Englishmen, and by the time of the American Revolution, the colonies
considered this right inviolable. As such, it was succinctly incorporated
into the first amendment by stating that "Congress shall make no law
abridging the right of the people peaceably, to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
The brevity of this clause in the first amendment left room for inter-
pretations which could have either expanded or limited the right of as-
sembly. Its terminology opened the door to a barrage of questions such
as: what constituted a peaceable assembly and at what point did such
an assembly become an unlawful one, to what extent were the States
constrained from abridging this right and was the purpose of the assem-
bly to be considered? These and other questions have been the bases of
many decisions through which the right to assemble has been clarified
and developed.
0 See DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 173-205 (1957), wherein he sets forth the texts
of the state proposals for amending the Constitution. Before ratification, four states,
Virginia, New York, North Carolina and Maryland, submitted amendments expressly
enunciating the freedom to assemble and petition.
7 A record of the discussions of the delegates on this issue is set forth in I Annals
of Congress 731-47 (1798).
8 Ch. 61 of the Magna Carta states, "[t]hat if, we, our justiciary, our bailiffs, or any
of our officers, shall in any circumstances have failed in the performance of them
toward any person, or shall have broken through any of these articles of peace and
security, and the offence be notified to four barons chosen out of the five-and-twenty
before mentioned, the said four barons shall repair to us, or our justiciary, if we are out
of the realm and laying open the grievance, shall petition to have it redressed without
delay." McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA, 465-77 (1914).
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The Court first had to clarify how literally the words of the first amend-
ment were to be taken. Certainly, legally protected peaceable assembly
did not only mean a group of people praying in church, nor could it
include a demogague inciting an audience to riot. What was a legally
protected peaceable assembly was left to the courts to answer. The most
prominent nineteenth century case answering this qustion was United
States v. Cruiks hank.9 Cruikshank and others were indicted for con-
spiracy under the Enforcement Act of 1870.10 They were charged with,
... banding together, with intent unlawfully and feloniously to injure, oppress,
threaten, and intimidate two citizens of the United States of African descent
and persons of color ... to hinder and prevent in their respective free exercise
and enjoyment of their lawful right and privilege to peaceably assemble."
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions of the lower court by
strictly construing the rights granted in the first amendment. They recog-
nized the inalienable freedom of assembly but also declared that assembly,
as the other freedoms granted, was not absolutely vested in the people.
In reaching the decision in Cruikshank, the Court explored whether the
States' laws of assembly were encompassed in the scope of the Enforce-
ment Act,12 and whether the assembly prevented by Cruikshank was one
which the Act protected. As to the first query, the Court stated,
[t]he first amendment of the Constitution prohibits Congress from "abridging
the right of the people to assemble and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances." This like the other amendments proposed and adopted at the
same time, was not intended to limit the powers of the State government in
respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National government
alone.13
Having so limited the sphere of the first amendment, it naturally fol-
lowed that any act of Congress protecting the guarantees of that amend-
ment would also be so limited. Thus, the Enforcement Act only applied
to the federal freedom of assembly. The court then decided that the
assembly prevented by the Cruikshank decision was not federally pro-
tected. "If it had been alleged [that] the object of the defendants was to
prevent a meeting [for the purpose of petitioning the government for a
redress of grievances, then] the case would have been within the statute,
and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States.' 4 Since no
allegation had been made, Cruikshank could not be considered to have
violated a federally protected right.
9 92 U.S. 542 (1876). 11 Supra note 9 at 544.
10 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 12Supra note 10.
1a United States v. Cruikshank, supra note 9 at 552.
14Ibid.
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The Cruikshank case represents the early conservative view of the
freedom of assembly, which subsequent decisions have modified. Today,
it is still recognized that an assembly can be prevented but only in a few
instances. In the words of the Illinois Supreme Court, "the [first amend-
ment] does not confer an absolute right, [without] responsibility, [or] an
unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible
use. . ."15 but it is not a right to be so shackled as in the Cruikshank case.
What is necessary is an examination of the purpose of a gathering before
declaring it to be a legally protected assembly.
[the] First Amendment [freedoms] are fundamental rights. But though funda-
mental, they are not in their nature absolute. . . . Their exercise is subject to
reasonable restriction required in order to protect the Government from de-
struction or serious injury.1
These statements, however, can be misleading. To test an assembly by
its purpose or reasonableness alone may lead to the denial of the privilege
of assembly merely because its purpose, in the eyes of society, is unrea-
sonable. This would, in effect, be reverting to the conservatism of the
Cruikshank decision-limiting free assembly to a well defined purpose. Yet,
the Court on many occasions has found the "purpose test" to be the most
practical in determining whether an assembly is protected by the first
amendment.
This test was firmly established in DeJonge v. Oregon,l where DeJonge
was convicted of violating Oregon's Criminal Syndicalism Act.' 8 The Act
defined criminal syndicalism as, "the doctrine which advocates crime,
physical violence, sabotage, or any unlawful acts or methods as a means of
accomplishing or effecting industrial or political change or revolution."'19
Dejonge was charged because of his assistance in conducting a meeting
called under the auspices of the Communist Party. His conviction was
upheld in the state's highest court,20 though no evidence was introduced
to show that at the meeting criminal syndicalism was advocated or that it
was, in any way, disorderly. He was found guilty merely because he as-
sisted in the meeting of an organization that advocated criminal syndi-
calism.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed De Jonge's con-
viction. Chief Justice Hughes, in expressing the Court's decision, wrote,
15 People v. Beauharnais, 408 111. 512, 516, 97 N.E.2d 343, 346 (1951).
16 Kiyoshi Okamoto v. United States, 152 F.2d 905, 907 (10th Cir. 1946).
17 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
18 14 OREGON CODE 3110-3112 (1930), as amended by ch. 459, Oregon Laws (1933).
191bid. 20 State v. De Jonge, 152 Ore. 315, 51 P.2d 674 (1935).
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[t]he question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be
preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its
purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution
protects. 21
The Court not only affirmed the "purpose test" as a basis for free assem-
bly, but also established guidelines for its application. It was considered a
"right cognate to those of free speech and free press [and] equally funda-
mental. '22 As such, the "clear and present danger" doctrine, heretofore
applied only to free speech, was officially recognized as the guideline in
free assembly cases.
The adoption of the clear and present danger doctrine represented a sig-
nificant step towards clarifying the continuing question of what assembly
was protected by the Constitution. Still, it did not provide a mathematical
formula for such determination, because which assemblies constituted clear
and present danger to the public depended on the view taken by the indi-
vidual members of the court in each particular case. This was vividly
shown by Terminiello v. City of Chicago'2 3 a case brought to the Supreme
Court after a conviction for disorderly conduct was upheld in Illinois'
highest court.2 4 The Supreme Court reversed the decision, but only by the
barest majority.25 At issue was the constitutionality of Chicago's disorder-
ly conduct ordinance, as interpreted by the Illinois court.26
Terminiello was brought to Chicago by General L. K. Smith to address
a meeting held under the auspices of the Christian Veterans of America.
About eight hundred people attended the meeting and over a thousand
people gathered outside the hall to protest his speaking. Terminiello's
speech criticized various racial and political groups and condemned the
crowd outside. The incensed crowd could hardly be contained. Rocks and
bottles were thrown, and many windows were broken. Afterwards, Ter-
miniello was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, under an ordi-
nance which provided that, "[aill persons who shall make, aid, counte-
nance, or assist in making improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of the
peace, within the limits of the city ... shall be deemed guilty of disorderly
21 De Jonge v. Oregon, supra note 17 at 365.
22Id at 364. 23 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
24 City of Chicago v. Terminiello, 396 11. 41, 71 N.E.2d 2 (1947), rehearing denied,
400 11 23, 79 N.E.2d 39 (1948).
25 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, supra note 23. Dissenting opinions were written
by Chief Justice Vinsen, Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson, who was joined by
Justice Burton.
2 6 CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 193, S 1 (1) (1939). The interpretation of this
section of the Code is found in City of Chicago v. Terminiello, supra note 24.
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conduct...,2 7 In the trial court, the jury was instructed that "misbehavior
may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites
dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if
it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing
alarm." 2 s
This interpretation of Chicago's ordinance was unacceptable to the ma-
jority of the Supreme Court because
a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.29
Thus, to deprive an individual of his constitutional rights of speech and
assembly merely because a crowd does not like what he has to say is re-
pugnant to the Constitution. It would appear that the court has made a
fine distinction in the application of the clear and present danger doctrine
to the right of assembly. When one directs a riot, encourages acts of vio-
lence, he has brought immediate danger to the public and therefore has
lost his constitutional guarantee of assembly. Contrarily, merely because a
riot results from his words is not sufficient to remove the protection of the
first amendment.
Justice Jackson voiced the strongest dissent to the majority opinion,
which was written by Justice Douglas. In sustaining the lower court deci-
sions he stated,
I am unable to see that the local authorities have transgressed the Federal Con-
stitution. Illinois imposed no prior censorship or suppression upon Terminiello.
On the contrary, its sufferance and protection was all that enabled him to
speak.30
Jackson, too, applied the clear and present danger test to Terminiello's
assembly, but arrived at an opposite result. "In this case the evidence
proves beyond dispute that danger of rioting and violence in response to
the speech was clear, present and immediate. '3 1 He concluded by saying
that
[t]his court has gone far toward accepting the doctrine that civil liberty means
the removal of all restraints from these crowds and that all local attempts to
maintain order are impairments of the liberty of the citizen. The choice is not
between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy with-
out either. There is danger that, if the court does not temper its doctrinaire
logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the Constitutional Bill of
Rights into a suicide pact.3 2
Although Justice Jackson dissents, he applies clear and present danger to
the freedom of assembly as the majority did. He differs with Justice Doug-
27Ibid. Id at 4. s1 Id at 26.
28 Supra note 23 at 3. 30 Id at 25. 32 Id at 37.
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las only to the extent of its application. No longer is it felt that the right
to assemble was only granted to those petitioning for a redress of griev-
ances. As one legal writer has put it, "[t]here is certainly no constitutional
right to disturb a meeting, but there is a constitutional right to hold one." 33
Today, we begin with the assumption that there is an inherent right in the
people to assemble for any purpose, but we qualify this assumption by the
use of the clear and present danger doctrine.
Accordingly, there are those who would deny the right to assemble to
an individual who, knowingly or unknowingly, directly or indirectly, pre-
cipitates others to act in a disorderly and conceivably dangerous manner.
Others, however, feel that the right of assembly should only be denied to
an individual who intentionally and directly rouses a group to dangerous
actions. To date, the staunchest advocate of the latter position has been
Justice Hugo L. Black. He has, on several occasions, found himself at com-
plete odds with the other members of the Court,34 because he views the
first amendment as containing "the broadest scope that could be counte-
nanced in an orderly society. '35 In his words,
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech,
press, petition and assembly guaranteed in the First Amendment must be ac-
corded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas
we cherish.36
EFFECT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Change in the interpretation of the first amendment freedoms was not
confined to the definition of peaceable assembly alone, for the general ap-
plicability of the amendment has also been broadened with the passage of
time. The early view held that "the First Amendment was not intended to
limit the powers of the State in respect to their own citizens, but to operate
upon the National government alone."'37 It was this reasoning that led to
the decision in Davis v. Massachusetts,38 wherein the Court held constitu-
tional an ordinance barring any public speaking on public property with-
out a permit. 39 The Court did not see fit to construe the guarantees of the
33 FELLMAN, THE CONSTTUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 29 (1963).
3a See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
supra note 1 at 137. Justice Black's dissent, one of four, is the only opinion based on
a broad interpretation of the first amendment's right of assembly. It is probably tfie most
liberal interpretation to be given this amendment.
35 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941).
36 Supra note I at 137.
37 United States v. Cruikshank, supra note 9 at 552.
38 167 U.S. 43 (1897).
39 BOSTfON, MAss., REv. ORDINANCES §66 (1893).
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first amendment as binding on the states despite the passage of the four-
teenth amendment twenty-nine years earlier. The court, in fact, stated that
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not
destroy the power of the state to enact police regulations as to the subjects
within their control ... [f]or the [state] legislature absolutely or conditionally
to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringe-
ment of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house.40
In subsequent years, the Davis doctrine was diluted and circumvented
by opinions advanced in support of the theory that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment protected the guarantees of the first amend-
ment from infringement by the State.41 Gaining the most popularity were
the incorporation and privilege theories. The incorporation theory was
used in Cantwell v. Connecticut,42 where a member of Jehovah's Witnesses
alleged denial by the State of his rights under the first amendment. He had
been arrested for violation of a Connecticut statute forbidding solicitation
without special permission.4' The Court, in reversing his conviction, stated:
We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants deprives
them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that
Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. 44
Thus, when the fourteenth amendment stated, "nor shall any State deprive
any person of liberty..." it was referring to the liberties guaranteed by
the first amendment.
The privilege theory was the basis for the decision in Hague v. Commit-
tee for Industrial Organization.4 Mayor Hague had refused to grant the
C.I.O. a permit to hold a meeting, contending that the organization was
infiltrated by Communists. In a suit to compel the Mayor to issue a permit,
the lower courts found that the Mayor had unlawfully denied the mem-
bers of the C.I.O. their constitutionally protected right of peaceable as-
sembly. Affirming the lower courts, the Supreme Court stated that
40 Davis v. Massachusetts, supra note 38 at 47.
41 DRINKER, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOUR FREEDOMS OF TwE FIRST AMENDMENT
20-26 (1957). Drinker discusses the four theories advanced to explain how the fourteenth
amendment forbids the states from impairing the first amendment freedoms.
42 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
43 CONN. GEN. STAT. S 6294, as amended by section 860d (1937 Supp.). "No person
shall solicit money, services, subcsriptions or any valuable thing for any religious,
charitable or philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the organization for
whose benefit such person is soliciting or within the county in which such persons or
organization is located unless such cause shall have been approved by the secretary of
the public welfare council."
44 Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra note 42 at 303 (emphasis added).
45 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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[alithough it has been held that the Fourteenth Amendment created no rights
in citizens of the United States, but merely secured exising rights against state
abridgment, it is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and to discuss these
topics, and to communicate respecting them is a privilege inherent in citizenship
of the United States which the Amendment protects.4 6
According to this theory, it was not necessary for the court to read a
meaning into specific words. The purpose of the fourteenth amendment
itself indicated its scope.
At this point, it is worthwhile to explore some of the underlying factors
motivating change in the first amendment. This article has shown that the
right of assembly has been expanded to afford the individual greater and
greater leeway, as the interpretation given "the right of the people peace-
ably, to assemble," has changed with changing times. The Court has increas-
ingly interpreted the provisions of the first amendment to allow the indi-
vidual more freedom in line with the current libertarian trends.
[In viewing civil liberties,] it has become clear that the judges, especially those
on the Supreme Court, play a significant role in enforcing constitutional guar-
antees. In fact, this combination of judicial enforcement and written guarantees
of enumerated liberties is one of the basic features of the American system of
government. The full significance of this combination has only recently been
recognized.47
The emergence of the Court, as a protector of the individual's civil liber-
ties, has only recently been recognized, because only recently have minor-
ity groups demanded that the Court assume this role. Certainly, these lib-
erties originated in the Constitution and gained importance during the
Civil War period, but the full import of these guarantees was not realized
until the issues of contemporary society forced the courts to clarify them.
Thus, a correlation may be drawn between the interpretation given the
right of assembly at any one time in relation to the importance of the
questions of civil rights at that time.
Another change previously noted, was the expansion of the first amend-
ment to include the states. Before the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment, there was no thought to restrict the powers of the states with regard
to first amendment questions. Today, there is no doubt that the fourteenth
amendment prevents the states from impairing one's constitutional guar-
antees of freedom. 4s Yet, almost sixty years passed before the Court offi-
46 Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
47 BURNS AND PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 213 (1960).
48 See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 130 F.2d 652 (3rd Cir. 1942), aff'd., 319 U.S. 157
(1942); State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944). See also, Hughes v. Superior
Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293, 1333
(1961).
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cially affirmed this position. 49 It is puzzling why the court took so long to
give this interpretation, when undoubtedly within those years, the oppor-
tunity to make such a pronouncement had often arisen.
This too, can be related to the times:
[F]rom the day the colonists first set foot on the soil of the New World,
Americans have been arguing about the proper division of powers between
central and local governments. 50 At one time or another northerners, south-
erners, businessmen, farmers, workers, Federalists, Democrats, Whigs, and Re-
publicans have thought it improper to vest a particular function in the national
government. They opposed control by Washington in the name of maintaining
the federal system. But underlying the debates were such issues as slavery,
labor-management relations, government regulation of business, civil rights. 51
The hesitance of the American people to place too much power in their
national government was reflected by the courts. However, this attitude
underwent a great change in the late twenties and early thirties for, "[a]s
the American people struggled to extricate themselves from the disaster of
depression .. .[t]hey entered the new era of reform full of nationalistic
fervor .. .52 This attitude infiltrated the Court so that when an appropri-
ate situation arose it was used to gain more control for the federal govern-
ment. So it was that this control was extended by enlarging the previous
understanding of the fourteenth amendment.
USE OF PUBLIC PROPERTY FOR ASSEA4BLY
Once the court extended the guarantees of assembly to state activity
through the fourteenth amendment, it was inundated by a myriad of suits
involving the constitutionality of local statutes regulating the right to as-
semble on public propery. In Coughlin v. Chicago Park District,53 the
Illinois Supreme Court was asked to decide the constitutionality of a Chi-
cago ordinance which gave the Park District Commissioner complete dis-
cretion in granting a permit to assemble in Park District facilities.5 4 Father
Coughlin, a member of the National Union for Social Justice, was to give
a lecture in Chicago on "social justice." The National Union reasonably
expected an audience of 100,000 people. No private facility in Chicago
could accommodate them so Father Coughlin applied to the Park District
for the use of Soldier Field, the only adequate facility in Chicago. When
49 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), was one of the first cases extending the
fourteenth amendment to cover the first.
50 Supra note 47 at 113. 51 Id at 114.
52 WILLIAMS, CURRENT, FREIDEL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 527 (1960).
53 364 111.90,4 N.E.2d 1 (1936).
54 CHICAGO, ILL., PARK DISTRICT ORDINANCES ch. 1, § 14 (1934).
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the permit was refused, Father Coughlin brought an action for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Commissioner to issue a permit.
The Illinois court refused to issue the writ on the grounds that "no citi-
zen has a right to use at his pleasure, or on his own terms, public property
belonging to and under the control of a municipality. . . ."55 In arriving at
this conclusion, the court found it necessary to elaborate on the history of
Soldier Field, to explain why it was never intended to serve the function
of a public meeting grounds. Tracing its history from the proposed archi-
tectural plans to completion and use in the ensuing years, the court con-
cluded that it was predominantly a sports field. As such, "the [right] of
peaceable assembly [was] not infringed by the refusal of a permit ...-5
If the nature of the public property in question had been such that it was
normally designated for the use of public assemblies, then a complete
discretionary power in the hands of the Commissioner would have prob-
ably been considered unconstitutional. Inasmuch as Soldier Field was not
designated as a public forum, Father Coughlin could no more demand its
use than he could demand the use of the City Council chambers.
A similar suit was brought to the California Supreme Court by the
American Civil Liberties Union, which sought a writ of mandamus to com-
pel the Los Angeles Board of Education to grant the use of its school build-
ing for a monthly meeting.5 7 A permit for its use had been refused because
the A.C.L.U. had refused to furnish a Statement of Information as required
by the Education Code.5 S In order to use a school building for public
meetings, the Code required a sworn statement disclaiming any intent to
use the property to aid a movement to overthrow the government, advo-
cacy of unlawful overthrow, and communistic character of the organiza-
tion.59 The A.C.L.U. refused to furnish such a statement on the grounds
that this abridged its freedom of speech and assembly.
In this instance, the California court did issue a writ of mandamus, be-
cause while the right of assembly is subject to certain limitations, "[a] state
55 Supra note 53 at 107, 4 N.E.2d at 9. 56 Id. at 111. 4 N.E.2d at 10.
5 7 American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California v. Board of Education
of City of Los Angeles, 55 Cal. 2d 167, 359 P.2d 45 (1961).
58 Los ANGELES, CAL., EDUCATION CODE S 16564-5 (1953).
59 Id. at § 16564: "Any use, by an individual, society, or organization for the com-
mission of any act intended to further any program or movement the purpose of
which is to accomplish the overthrow of the government of the United States ... shall
not be permitted .. " Id. at § 16565: "No governing board of a school district shall
grant the use of any school property to any person or organization for any use in vio-
lation of § 16564 ... The school board may require the furnishing of such additional
information as it deems necessary to make the determination that the use of school
property for which application is made would not violate § 16564 of the Education
Code."
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is without power to impose an unconstitutional requirement as a condition
for granting a privilege even though the privilege is the use of state prop-
erty."'0 Once the city had authorized the use of its facilities for public
forums, it could not limit that use through a means which in essence
abridged one's constitutional right of free assembly.
From these cases, it may be concluded that under the first and four-
teenth amendments there is not an inherent right in individual members
of society to use public property to exercise the right of peaceable assem-
bly. However, once authorities unlock the facilities and allow public as-
sembly, they are bound to grant this privilege in accordance with the dic-
tates of the first amendment. The Court will carefully scrutinize an
ordinance regulating the use of public facilities to see that it does not in-
fringe upon constitutionally guaranteed rights.
Thus, the state, as well as the federal government, is restricted from in-
fringing the right to assemble, and only in two instances may regulations
be imposed: first, to direct how, when and by whom public property may
be used to assemble, such directions being in themselves constitutional, and
secondly, to make certain types of assemblies unlawful and therefore,
criminal.61 Of course, unlawful assemblies will, in fact, be the antithesis of
the constitutionally protected peaceable assemblies heretofore discussed.
PICKETING AND DEMONSTRATIONS
There is no doubt that demonstrations and picketing are forms of as-
sembly. Not until this century, however, was the right to picket and to
demonstrate firmly established as constitutionally guaranteed under the
first amendment right of assembly. This is understandable, because picket-
ing and demonstrations are the basic tactics of labor unions and civil rights
groups. Since these organizations were not often successful in using these
tactics until this century, the courts were not confronted by such ques-
tions. The difference between these modes of expression, as opposed to
pure speech, has caused a somewhat different conception of free assembly
to develop regarding them.
Edwards v. South Carolina62 is illustrative of many cases involving dem-
onstrations by civil rights groups in the South. This case began with the
conviction of one hundred and eighty seven Negro teenagers for the
common law crime of breach of the peace. They had originally gathered
together in front of a church and split up into small groups of about fif-
60 Supra note 57 at 649, 359 P.2d at 47.
61 For a complete discussion of what constitutes an unlawful assembly see, Note,
47 YALE L.J. 404 (1938); Note, 26 THE LEGAL OBSERVER 545 (1856); Brown, What
Constitutes Riot, 18 ORE. L. REv. 254 (1939).
62 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
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teen, marching separately to the State House carrying placards protesting
discrimination. The placards contained such statements as, "I am proud to
be a Negro" and "Down with segregation." 63 These groups were greeted
at the State House grounds by about thirty police officers who warned
them to remain peaceful. As the groups paraded in an orderly manner,
approximately three hundred onlookers collected. Subsequently, the police
ordered the machers to leave. Instead of leaving, they began singing free-
dom songs, stamping their feet and clapping, and they were immediately
arrested.
The case was ultimately appealed to the United States Supreme Court on
the sole contention that the state had infringed upon the marchers' right to
assemble and petition for a redress of grievances. In agreeing with the po-
sition of the marchers, the court stated that "this case reflects an exercise
of these basic constitutional rights in the most pristine and classic form,
[they] peaceably assembled at the site of the State Government and there
peaceably expressed their grievance ...-4 The Court did not differentiate
between an assemblage which verbalized grievances from one which dis-
played them on placards. Both were entitled to the same constitutional
protection which is qualified only by the clear and present danger doc-
trine.
The Court, however, was not in unanimity. There were those who felt
that there were certain elements in demonstrations which made it neces-
sary to broaden the concept of what constituted a clear and present dan-
ger. The presence of a group of demonstrators advocating an unpopular
cause could instantaneously incite onlookers to act in defiance of the dem-
onstrators. "[T]o say that the police may not intervene until the riot has
occurred is like keeping out the doctor until the patient dies."6 5 Because
of this element of uncertainty it was felt that the police should be vested
with a greater degree of discretion. Since in the Edwards case the police
reasonably felt that the presence of the marchers and onlookers might
erupt into a disorderly situation, it should have been within their power to
terminate the demonstration.
In essence, the question of how to apply the clear and present danger
doctrine to demonstrations divided the court. The majority felt that there
must be substantial evidence of imminent danger before police restraint,
while the dissenters felt that restraint, to be at all effective, must come
before anything erupts. Thus, the dissenters felt that only the officials ac-
tually present at the demonstration were in a position to determine the
necessity for restraint, and their decision should be conclusive.
63 Id. at 231. 64 Id. at 235.
65 Id. at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
When a demonstration is obviously disorderly and chaotic, there is no
doubt that it can be restrained. However, making noise or commotion
does not automatically constitute grounds for restraint. In Flores v. Den-
ver,66 the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a conviction of breach of the
peace against a group of demonstrators for this very reason. Fifty people
had assembled in front of the Governor's home and began chanting com-
plaints which could be heard for several blocks. The court did not con-
sider this a breach of the peace because, "the noise involved was incidental
to a legitimate right, protected by the Constitution, to appeal to those in
authority for redress of grievances by remonstrance, and such right must
be balanced against the right of the community to peace and quiet." 67
It is apparent that a demonstration cannot be judged only by the cause
it advocates or solely by the commotion it creates. Even a completely non-
violent demonstration can transcend the bounds of constitutionally pro-
tected assembly. For example, during the recent water shortage in New
York, a group of civil rights workers proposed to bring attention to their
cause by gathering together and squandering water.68 Certainly, under the
prevailing conditions, an assemblage for this purpose would not be consti-
tutionally protected and restraint could justifiably be exercised. In the
final analysis, however, it remains for the court, through hindsight, to de-
termine whether the police used foresight in restraining an assembly from
becoming a riot or trampled upon their right of peaceable assembly.
There is a slight difference between demonstrating and picketing, and
the courts have taken cognizance of this. Whereas demonstrations seek to
call attention to an alleged problem, picketing seeks directly to restrain
the public from contributing to the alleged problem.
It is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality
and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being dissem-
inated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the subject of restrictive regu-
lation.60
In Hughes v. Superior Court of California,70 Justice Frankfurter found
it necessary to explain the uniqueness of picketing, to justify an injunction
of the Superior Court of California restraining it. The injunction had been
issued against the Progressive Citizens of America, to restrain them from
picketing in front of a local store. The pickets demanded that the store
owners hire more Negro clerks, in proportion to the predominantly Negro
66 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1950). 67 id. at 77, 220 P.2d at 376.
68 NEw REPUBLIC, May 9, 1964, p. 14.
69 Bakery Drivers Local v. Vohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942).
70 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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neighborhood, where the store was located. Justice Frankfurter explained
that,
while picketing is a mode of communication . . it is inseparably something
more and different... It has been amply recognized that picketing, not being
the equivalent of speech as a matter of fact, is not its legal equivalent. Picketing
is not beyond the control of a State if the manner in which picketing is conducted
or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance."'
The Court felt, in the Hughes case, that the reasons underlying the picket-
ing were not justifiable, since the hiring of one's employees should not be
determined by the proportion of the races in the community.
In Thornhill v. Alabama,' 2 the Court made it abundantly clear that
though picketing had special characteristics subjecting it to governmental
regulation, it was still a form of assembly and thus, could not be restrained
entirely. At issue was the constitutionality of an Alabama statute labeled,
"Loitering or picketing forbidden."73 Thornhill was convicted under this
statute for participating in a union picket line during a strike. In reversing
his conviction the court held that,
[t]he power and the duty of the state to take adequate steps to preserve
the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents
cannot be doubted. But no clear and present danger of destruction of life or
property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace can be
thought to be inherent in the activities of every person who approaches the
premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute involving
the latter.7 4
In light of the Thornbill decision, statutes which place a blanket restric-
tion on picketing have been held to be repugnant to the constitutional
right of assembly. The courts will sanction restraint of picketing only
when it is not peaceable or when it is for an unlawful purpose. 75
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The right of assembly has thus far been viewed in its classical form: a
group of individuals gathering together to discuss, debate, picket or dem-
onstrate in order to further a lawful purpose. But freedom of assembly has
still another facet. In the process of its evolution, it has come to include the
right to belong, that is, to associate. It has often been said of Americans
71ld. at 464. 72310 U.S. 88 (1940).
7 3 ALA. CODE, § 3448 (1923): "Any person or persons, who, without a just cause or
legal excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any
other person, firm, corporation, or association of people engaged in a lawful business,
for the purpose, or with intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade
with, or be employed by such persons, . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
74 Supra note 72 at 105.
75 See Note, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 453, 461 (1964).
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that they are, "chronic joiners."76 No one would contest an individual's
right to join a church group, bridge club, health club or a union. Were
these and other groups like them the only ones in our society, the right of
association, most likely, would never have emerged. However, Americans
join other types of groups which are controversial in nature and arouse the
hostility of many. Because of these groups, the courts have had to expand
constitutional freedoms in some instances and limit them in others.
Two groups especially have been instrumental in creating and clarifying
the right of association, the National Association For The Advancement of
Colored People (N.A.A.C.P.) and the Communist Party. These groups
have, in one way or another, been involved in the majority of litigation
questioning the rights of association. This cannot be attributed to any
similarity of purpose. Certainly the aim of furthering the rights of Ameri-
can citizens cannot be compared with the advocacy of abolishing the
American way of life. Yet, in actuality, a basic similarity exists, in that
members have been prejudiced against, restrained, restricted and con-
demned because they belonged.
De Jonge v. Oregon,77 which was discussed earlier, is said to be the
forerunner of the association cases. De Jonge, an alleged communist, was
convicted of criminal syndicalism 78 on the basis of his association rather
than his actions. Nowhere in the Supreme Court's decision, reversing the
conviction, was reference made to the freedom of association. It was indi-
cated, however, that the right of assembly could not be infringed because
of the "auspices under which the meeting is held."79 This indication
planted the seeds from which the new right was to grow, but not until the
Fifties did the court openly announce it in connection with the Commu-
nist cases.
The critical test for American Communists came after the passage of the
Smith Act in 1940.0 This was the first sedition law applicable in peace-
time since 1798,81 and it made it a crime to advocate the violent overthrow
of the government. This was followed in 1950 by the McCarran Act,8 2
which attempted to "strip the veil of secrecy from communist political
activity and to impose certain disabilities on communists.83 In testing the
76 ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 171 (1961).
77 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
78 14 OREGON CODE 3110-3112 (1930), as amended by ch. 459, OREGON LAWS (1933).
79 Supra note 77 at 365.
80 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1940). 8 1 Supra note 47 at 154.
82 Internal Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1950).
83 Supra note 47 at 156.
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constitutionality of these statutes the court clarified what exactly freedom
of association entailed.
The McCarran Act created the Subversive Activities Control Board to
determine whether a particular organization was a communist action,
front, or infiltrated group. 4 Under section seven of the Act, an organiza-
tion found to be a communist action group was required to register with
the Attorney General and file a list of its members. Failure to file was to
result in a fine of up to $10,000 a day. In extensive hearings, the Board con-
cluded that the American Communist Party was a communist action
group, but the Party refused to register in accordance with section seven.
Ironically enough, this group, intent on the destruction of the Constitu-
tion and the American form of government, stood on their constitutional
rights in refusing to comply with the McCarran Act.
The Court in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,8 5
a case previously discussed, rejected their arguments. By the narrowest
margin it held that constitutionally protected rights were not infringed by
the registration and list requirements imposed by the McCarran Act. Jus-
tice Frankfurter, writing the majority opinion felt that the evidence pro-
duced, as to the intentions of the Party, was sufficient to exclude them
from the general protection afforded by the first amendment.
Congress has found that these action organizations employ methods of infil-
tration and secretive and coercive tactics; that by operating in concealment
and through Communist-front organizations they are able to obtain the sup-
port of persons who would not extend such support knowing of their true
nature; that a Communist network exists in the United States; and that the
agents of communism have devised methods of sabotage and espionage carried
out in successful evasion of existing law. The purpose of the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Act is said to be to prevent the world-wide Communist conspiracy
from accomplishing its purposes 6
The basis for the majority opinion is the balancing test, balancing the harm
to the public in general against the infringement of an individual's rights.
84 Supra note 82. When a determination is made by the Board certain disabilities are
imposed. An action group is one substantially directed by the U.S.S.R., or whose
principle objective is to advance world communism. It must register annually with the
Attorney General, report the names of all members, inform the Attorney General of
all printing equipment and propaganda publications, cannot hold a passport or hold an
elective office, cannot serve as an officer of a union, and cannot work in any defense
plant. A front group is one which is dominated by a communist action organization
and is subject to the same restrictions as an action group except that it need not report
the names of every individual member and members may work in defense plants if
they make known their membership. An infiltrated organization is one which is sub-
stantially dominated by persons giving aid to communist action groups. It is subject
to the restrictions on publications, loses all rights accorded to unions under national laws
and cannot hold passports or elective office.
85 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 86 Id. at 94.
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When the public's welfare is at stake, the Court felt the denial of personal
rights is justifiable.
Among the dissenters, there were varied opinions. Chief Justice Warren
felt that the Party should not be required to register since the evidence
produced against the Party only proved advocacy of unlawful overthrow,
but did not show an immediate attempt to incite action.s7 Justices Douglas
and Brennan were of the opinion that the registration and list requirements
were inconsistent with the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment.
The strongest dissent, however, came from Justice Black, who not only
disclaimed the balancing test as contrary to the intent of the first amend-
ment, but considered its application in the present case an insult to the
American people.
It is plain that there are Governments in the world today that desperately
need to suppress such protests for they probably could not survive a week or
even a day if they were deprived of the power to use their informers to intimi-
date, their jails to imprison and their firing squads to shoot their critics. In
countries of that kind, repressive measures like the Smith Act and the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act are absolutely necessary to protect the ruling
tyrants from the spread of information about their misdeeds. But in a democ-
racy like ours, such laws are not only unnecessary but also constitute a baseless
insult to the patriotism of our people.88
Though the provision of the McCarran Act which requires the Commu-
nist Party to register as a communist-action group, has been held consti-
tutional, the court held it unconstitutional to require an individual to regis-
ter.89 The Act provides that if the official party does not register each in-
dividual member must do so.90 This requirement was felt to be contrary
to the fifth amendment since, "mere association with the Communist Party
presents sufficient threat of prosecution to support a claim of privilege."91
The Communist cases have brought the right of association into promi-
nence, as have the N.A.A.C.P. cases, wherein the right to associate was also
jeopardized. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,92 arose out of that state's attempt to
compel the Alabama N.A.A.C.P. to furnish a list of all members within the
state, under a statute requiring foreign corporations conducting business
within the state to register with the state. The Supreme Court, in holding
the statute inapplicable to the N.A.A.C.P. stated that, "[i]nviolability of
privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable
to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
87 Id. at 131. 881 d. at 167.
89 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
9 o Supra note 82, S 786(d) (4) (1964).
91 Supra note 89 at 77. 92 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
COMMENTS
espouses dissident beliefs. '93 Similarly, an Arkansas statute was held uncon-
stitutional because, "[tlhe municipalities have failed to demonstrate a con-
trolling justification for the deterrence of free association which compul-
sory disclosure of the membership lists would cause."'9 4 In Louisiana v.
N.A.A.C.P.,9 5 the Supreme Court struck down a statute which required
non-trading associations, such as the N.A.A.C.P., to file an affidavit listing
their officers and attesting that none were affiliated with any communist
organizations. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, stated, "[w]e deal
with a constitutional right, since freedom of association is included in the
bundle of First Amendment rights made applicable to the States by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 And since, he went
on to say, under present conditions, "disclosure of membership lists results
in reprisals against and hostility to the members, disclosure is not re-
quired. '9 7
In dealing with the N.A.A.C.P. cases, the Court did not balance the right
to associate with the organization against the group's effect on the public,
as it did in the communist cases. The Communist Party was singled out for
such treatment because
the particular character of the Communist Party and its objectives outweigh
the right of individual Communists to conceal party membership or affiliations
...other groups [do not] automatically forfeit their rights to privacy of
association [because] the general subject matter of the legislative inquiry is
Communist subversion or infiltration [of that group].98
In light of the holdings in the Communist and N.A.A.C.P. cases, it is
clear that, "the Supreme Court [is] recognizing an independent right of
association,"99 which has been merged into the guarantees of the first
amendment. The Court's majority, however, despite criticism, has seen fit
to qualify it by applying the balancing test.100 The right of association is,
in fact, an extension of the right to assemble but due to its contemporary
importance it is categorized independently, and the Supreme Court has
thus, "affirmed the right 'to engage in association for the advancement of
o31d. at 462.
94 Bates v. City of Little Rock Ark., 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960).
95 366 U.S. 293 (1961). 96 ld at 296. 97Ibid.
98 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
99 Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 13
(1964).
100 See Justice Black's opinion in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Com-
mittee, supra note 98; Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self Preservation against Politi-
cal Freedom, 49 CAL. L. REv. 4 (1961); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962).
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beliefs and ideas,' "101 regardless of the acceptability of those beliefs to the
community in which they are preached. Only in certain Communist cases
have the fears of the people exerted enough pressure to cause the denial of
freedom of association, for as in the past, the court has not escaped the
apprehensions of the public.
FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY IN THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Abraham Lincoln once wrote that, "the right of peaceable assembly and
of petition and by article Fifth of the Constitution, the right of amend-
ment, is the Constitutional substitute for revolution. Here is our Magna
Carta, not wrested by Barons from King John, but the free gift of states
to the nation they create ... 102 All but two states constitutionally guar-
antee the right of assembly.10 Most of the state "assembly" clauses are
similar to the provision of the first amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. However, certain differences are noteworthy.
Thirty nine states, including Illinois, have qualified the rigbt of the peo-
ple, peaceably to assemble, by inserting the phrase "for the common
good."'01 4 It is somewhat strange that this clause should have found its way
into so many of the states' constitutions and not into the federal constitu-
tion. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the delegates, contending
that the Constitution should contain a declaration of freedoms, proposed
amendments for this purpose and most of the clauses pertinent to the right
of assembly contained the phrase "for the common good."' 05 Yet, when
the Bill of Rights was adopted by the Convention, this phrase was deleted
from the guarantee of assembly. Although a few contend that this exclu-
sion was inadvertent, it is generally conceded that the framers of the
101 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963).
102 A letter to Alexander H. Stephens, January 19, 1860, in UNCOLLECTED LETTERS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 127 (Gilbert Tracy ed. 1917).
103 The Virginia and New Mexico Constitutions do not specifically guarantee the
Right to assemble.
104 The following State constitutional assembly provisions contain the words "for the
common good." ALA. CONST. art. I, S 25; ARIZ. CONST., art. II, § 5; ARK. CONST. art. II,
§ 4; CALIF. CoNST. art. I, § 10; CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 24; CONN. CoNsT. art. I, § 16; DEL.
CONST. art I, § 16; FLA. CONsT., art. I, § 15: GA. CONST. art. I, 5 1, par. 24; ILL. CONST.
art II, § 17; IowA CONST. art I, § 20; MAss. CONST., art. XIX; ME. CONST. art. I, § 15;
MICH. CONST. art II, § 2; Mo. CoNs'r. art. I, § 9; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 26; NEB. CONST.
art I, § 19; NEW H. CONST., art. 32; N.J. CONsT. art. I, § 18; NEV. CONST. art I, S 10; N.D.
CoNsT. art I, § 10; PA. CONST. art I, 5 20; S.D. CONST. art III, § 4; WASH. CONST. art I, § 4;
W. VA. CONST. art III, § 16; WIS. CONST. art I, § 4; Wyo. CoNsT. art I, § 21. Twelve states
insert the phrase "for their common good." IDAHO CONST. art I, § 10; IND. CONST. art I,
§ 31; KAN. CONsr., § 3; Ky. CONST., § 1 par. 6; N.C. CONST. art I, § 25; OHIO CONST. art. I,
§ 3; OKLA. CONST. art II, § 3; ORE. CoNsT. art. I, § 26; R.I. CONST. art I, § 21; TENN.
CONST. art. I, § 23; TEx. CONST. art I, § 27; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 20.
105 See DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 173-205 (1957).
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Constitution and Bill of Rights were extremely careful in their choice of
words so that there is reason to believe that there was a purpose in drafting
the first amendment without the proposed phrase for the common good.
The historical setting of the constitutional Convention and the court's
interpretation of the right of assembly point out that,
[n]o purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer than that of securing
for the people of the United States much greater freedom of religion, expres-
sion, assembly, and petition than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed.
It cannot be denied, for example, that [the] restrictions upon assembly then
prevalent in England would have been regarded as measures which the Con-
stitution prohibited the American Congress from passing. ... Ratified as it was
while the memory of many oppressive English restrictions on the enumerated
liberties was still fresh, the First Amendment cannot reasonably be taken as
approving prevalent English practices. On the contrary, the only conclusion
supported by history is that the unqualified prohibitions laid down by the
framers were intended to give [the liberties enumerated] the broadest scope
that could be countenanced in an orderly society.' 06
The clause, for the common good, qualifies an otherwise unqualified
provision: it is ambiguous and undefined. Few Americans will consider a
meeting to advocate fascism for the common good. Yet, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has declared such a meeting protected by the guarantee of
assembly, 0 though the New Jersey Constitution itself contains a com-
mon good clause. A meeting condemning Negroes and Jews does not serve
the common good, but the United States Supreme Court has held such an
assembly guaranteed by the constitution. 108 Were the courts truly bound
to delve into whether or not an assembly served the common good, it is
likely that many assemblies that have been held to be protected by the
constitution would lose this protection.
Besides the common good clause, other variations have crept into the
States' assembly clauses. North Carolina, for example, concludes the usual
provision with, "[b]ut secret political societies are dangerous to the liber-
ties of a free people and should not be tolerated."' 0 9 This is certainly a
strong admonition, but of what it is difficult to say. Apparently, freedom
of assembly is denied to secret political groups, and it is up to the courts to
decide which groups fall into that category. This provision is certainly
unique in constitutional grants of freedom and, unfortunately, leaves room
for wide discretion in limiting the right to assemble.
Six states have limited the right to assemble by inserting the phrase, "for
106 Bridges v.. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1914).
107 American League of the Friends of the New Germany of Hudson County
v. Eastmead, 116 N.J. Eq. 487, 174 Atl. 156 (1934).
108 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
109 N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 25.
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proper purposes."'110 These same states also have the common good clause,
but seek to define further what is for the common good by including the
phrase "proper purpose." In fact, they pose another ambiguity to be wres-
tled with. Few will consider a communist cell meeting serving a proper
purpose in American society, yet, such a meeting is not unlawful per se.
THE ILLINOIS PROVISION FOR FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
In one short sentence the Illinois Constitution guarantees its citizens
freedom of assembly:
The people have the right to assemble in a peaceable manner to consult for
the common good, to make known their opinions to their representatives, and
to apply for redress of grievances."'
It differs substantively from the federal constitution only in the insertion
of the "common good" clause. This is a limitation on the general right
and presents a problem of interpretation. Throughout the history of the
right of assembly there has been a continuous trend toward broadening
our concept of free assembly. Any seeming limitation is contrary to this
trend. Of course, it is impossible to put into words the entire scope of the
assembly provision. This is the problem that confronts the drafters of any
constitution. Any qualification creates the possibility of infringement con-
trary to the intent of the framers. Thus, we saw in the Cruikshank case"12
where the words of the first amendment, "to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances," were taken literally to mean that an assembly was
only protected if it gathered for that purpose. Many people were denied
their right to assemble because of this interpretation. Many people today
would be denied their right to assemble because their assembly does not
meet the standard of the common good.
The evolution of the right of assembly since the Cruikshank case has
shown that the redress of grievances clause was not to be taken literally. It
may reasonably be said, then, that it is an unnecessary clause asserting
nothing and, in view of the interpretation given it by the court, limiting
nothing. A constitution drafted today would, undoubtedly, not contain
such a clause, for it would be wary of the history enriching the freedom.
In the same way, no government vests in its citizens an absolute right, and
a provision seemingly absolute in its terms is understood to contain inher-
ent qualifications. Hence, there are different philosophies in framing a con-
stitutional provision of freedom: that the guarantee should be absolute,
110 Supra note 104. The phrase "for proper purposes," or "for other proper purposes,"
is found in the Constitutions of Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, North Dakota, Penn-
sylvania and Tennessee.
III ILL. CONST. art. II, s 17.
112 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S, 542 (1876).
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leaving room for restriction only in extreme cases; or secondly, that the
provision should start out as a qualified right, granting freedom in most
cases but restricting it when it endangers the constitution itself. The for-
mer philosophy is the only one acceptable to contemporary America for,
if we deny freedom, "to the ideas we hate . . . sooner or later [it] will be
denied to the ideas we cherish." 113
The framers of the federal and state constitutions did not enumerate, as
part of the rights given, the freedom to associate. This was not due to any
inadvertance on their parts, but simply because the right of association was
not questioned. Only in this century has condemnation by association be-
come such a critical problem. At that juncture, it became necessary for
the courts to herald this right, one which had been implied in the freedom
to assemble. Had such problems been foreseen by the framers of the fed-
eral and state Constitutions, they probably would not have left its declara-
tion to the courts but would have included it as one of the classic freedoms.
It properly belongs in a constitution. The courts have adopted it as part of
the right of assembly, for not only is one guaranteed the right to assemble,
but one is not restricted in his choice of associates with whom to exercise
this right.
CONCLUSION
A myriad of decisions has brought us to our present understanding of
the freedom of assembly. We now look on it as a right of limitless scope.
From the guarantee in the first amendment, the courts have been directed
as to the rights of pickets and demonstrators, the states have been cau-
tioned as to its regulation of assembly and citizens have been apprised of
the right of minorities. No single clause can ever seek to encompass with
clarity the detailed facet of this right. It can only attempt not to infringe
it. Thus, it must be stated in such a way that it merely recognizes the exist-
ence of an inalienable right. In its simplicity must lie its strength. Accord-
ingly, the freedom of assembly and of association should be guaranteed by
a constitutional provision stating that,
The right of the people peaceably to assemble and associate shall never be
abridged.
Melvin Rishe
113 Supra note 85 at 137.
